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INTRODUCTION 
Since mid-December of 1984, a number of terrorist actions have 
taken place in Western Europe. These recent episodes represent a water-
shed in terrorist activity and a dramatic change in the direction of 
Western European terrorism. 
The current wave of episodes began with the foiled car-bomb at-
tempt on a United States-sponsored North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
school in the West German town of Oberammergau.1 This was quickly 
followed by successful attacks at other NATO installations and the 
assassinations of French Brigadier General Rene Audran, on January 25, 
1985, and of West German industrialist Ernst Zimmerman, on February 
1, 1985. Zimmerman's firm manufactured aircraft and tank engines for 
NATO, including those used in the new Leopard II tank. Along with the 
assassinations some sixty bombs have exploded at NATO installations 
across Europe.2 
Amidst these actions have come communiqués from various 
Western European terrorist groups announcing a war against NATO and 
heralding an open alliance between the groups to accomplish that pur-
pose. On January 15, 1985, France's Direct Action and West Germany's 
Red Army Faction, the heirs to the Baader-Meinhof gang, announced to 
Paris-based news agencies that the two groups would now cooperate in 
the fight against NATO.3 The Communist Combatant Cells, of Belgium, 
echoed the theme after an attack on a U.S. military recreation center out-
side Brussels on the same date.4 Two weeks later in solidarity with the 
Red Army Faction (RAF), a Portuguese-based groups called FP-25 at-
tacked a West German airbase outside of Lisbon.5 
What is different about these recent actions is that they are directed 
at a specific target, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and they em-
body an evolution in the ideology and tactics of terrorism in Western 
Europe. The most important change seen in this new spate of bombings 
and assassinations is the abandonment of indiscriminate violence, so 
characteristic of terrorism in the past, for the adoption of a tactic which 
focuses on a single, salient target. To understand the importance of this 
change, it is necessary to consider both the tactical and ideological role 
that indiscriminate violence has played in Western European terrorism. 
The violent actions of the RAF have sometimes been more 
associated with carefully selected targets rather than with indiscriminate 
activities. This is in large part due to the attention given to the RAF's 
more dramatic operations — the kidnapping of Peter Lorenz and the 
assassination of Hans Martin Schleyer — than to its more common type 
of activity. Both in the scope of its targets and in casualties inflicted, the 
Baader-Meinhof gang usually practiced indiscriminate violence and the 
favorite weapon of the original gang was the firebomb. Ulrike Meinhof 
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and the other gang leaders were originally indicted for seventy-two fire 
bombings which killed four and injured forty. The greatest single episode 
of the gang's indiscriminate violence took place in May of 1972 when fif-
teen explosions injured some thirty-eight civilians in Hamburg. The 
targets of the gang's operations included, but were not limited to: U.S. 
business interests, U.S. military installations, El Al airlines, Lufthansa, 
West German magistrates, Springer publishing offices, department 
stores, OPEC ministers, and NATO installations, a veritable potpourri 
of targets. Whatever Libya's private thinking about the Baader-Meinhof 
gang, the government's official position was that the gang's activities 
were so lacking in direction and so without recognizable revolutionary 
goals that they were to be rejected.6 The second generation RAF, 
1977-1984, did have a slightly more specific focus, assassinating promi-
nent individuals, but it too lacked the congruence of a single, specific 
target with a broader ideological appeal that would find a resonance 
among German youth. 
By contrast, Direct Action is best known for its indiscriminate kill-
ing of innocents. On October 20, 1981, it set off a booby-trapped van in 
Antwerp's diamond district, killing two and wounding nearly one hun-
dred passers-by. On August 9, 1982, it caused the carnage at Goldberg's 
Restaurant in Paris which left six dead and twenty-two wounded. This 
was followed two days later by the bombing of the Banque de Gestion 
Privée which seriously injured a bystander. Direct Action has varied its 
rationale for violence from the struggle against what it calls "French Im-
perialism in Africa" to anti-semitism to the more recent anti-NATO sup-
port of the RAF. 
FROM INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE TO DIRECTED VIOLENCE 
Terrorism, especially terrorism as it has manifested itself in most of 
Western Europe, has generally meant the use of indiscriminate — 
sometimes referred to as "random" — violence against innocents in 
order to bring about political change.7 Victims of terrorism are generally 
in no position to provide the terrorists with what they want. However, 
that is of no consequence, for the victims are merely surrogates for the 
state. They serve to demonstrate the impotency of the state in being able 
to preserve order and to provide for the safety of its citizens. Because be-
ing a victim is the result of a random event — being in the wrong place at 
the wrong time — a climate of fear pervades the entire society. The 
psychological weapon here is that no one feels safe, for unlike the situa-
tion where only prominent officials or people associated with a specific 
political movement are targets, everyone is a target. No one can look 
upon a terrorist episode and say, "It couldn't happen to me." It could 
and it does.' 
Underscoring this tactic is a philosophy of revolution drawn from a 
somewhat sophomoric interpretation of Marxism which sees revolution 
as coming about when things get worse.' Taking this route to revolution 
inspired the Weathermen to begin the "days of rage" in October 1969.10 
It is not only bad Marxism, totally ignoring the fact that Marx broke 
with Bakunin and Nechaev over their enthusiasm for a tactic which Marx 
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found ineffectual, but it produces the very opposite effect." It is not 
revolution which comes about when social misery is increased as people 
feel their personal safety is threatened. Instead, it is support for right-
wing elements to restore order, a fact which the Uruguayan military fully 
understood and the Tupamaros did not. There terrorism led not to a 
public uprising against a democratic regime which could not preserve 
order, but to public support for a military coup which snuffed out both 
the revolutionaries and Latin America's oldest democracy.12 
Similar tendencies for the general public to exchange liberty for 
order also exist in Western European democracies. Britain, Germany, 
and Italy have promulgated tough anti-terrorist legislation in response to 
waves of terrorist episodes.11 When Ulster-style terrorism arrived on 
English soil in 1972 with an explosion which killed seven people at the 
Aldershot officers' mess, the stage was set for the tough Prevention of 
Terrorism Act which passed Parliament without debate two years later. 
The Home Secretary, who introduced the proposed legislation, described 
it as "draconian" and "unprecedented in peacetime."14 Pub bombings, 
which took the lives of twenty-one persons in Birmingham that year, 
silenced those who had legitimate concerns about the effect of the legisla-
tion on civil liberties. Although the provisions of the Act were described 
as "temporary," the Act is still in force. 
Reality should have long ago suggested the fallacy of the theory of 
indiscriminate violence as the stepping stone to revolution. But there was 
another more important delusion which had to be overcome before the 
infatuation with random violence could end. That was the seductive view 
of violence as a mechanism of self-liberation. This was a delusion nur-
tured by the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre and those of Franz Fanon, the 
black psychiatrist who led Sarte to find in violence the psychological 
liberation of the oppressed.15 
It was this delusion of liberation through violence, of lacerating 
public sensitivity through indiscriminate destruction, which brought An-
dreas Baader to terrorism. Baader came not as a politico but as a rake 
and adventurer who embraced destruction with the same commitment 
some men embrace religion.16 
Political philosophy was hardly Baader 's strong suit; violence was. 
Baader's politics could be summed up in the convoluted logic of fellow 
comrade Gudrun Ensslin, "We set fires in department stores so that you 
will stop buying. The compulsion to buy terrorizes you."17 Fritz Teufel, 
Baader's comrade in arms, believed that given the choice between own-
ing a department store and burning one, a higher moral standard was 
reached having burned one than having owned one. Such was the 
substance of the gang's political theorizing.1' 
Ironically, it was none other than Baader who may have 
foreshadowed the evolution of terrorism from indiscriminate violence to 
directed violence. In a letter to the radical political group Kommune I, 
Baader wrote prophetically, "... when Bonn has fallen, leave NATO to 
us."19 With some sixty bombs exploding at NATO bases in Europe, 
Baader's heirs to political violence, the new incarnation of the Red Army 
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Faction, appear to have progressed to a far more dangerous form of 
violence than that engaged in by their predecessors.20 
THE LIMITATIONS OF ANARCHISM 
Baader never approved of the academic and media communities 
referring to him as an anarchist. The term undermined his self portrayal 
as a Marxist and interfered with his group being taken seriously. Unlike 
irredentist terrorist groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion or the Irish Republican Army, which, despite their violence, seemed 
to represent causes with a base of support, the Red Army Faction set its 
sights on denouncing the "wage slavery" and exploitation in a nation 
which had created the highest paid proletariat in the world. "Wage 
slavery" appeared less a characterization of the German working class 
than of the distorted mentality of the spoiled children of the upper 
bourgeoisie who had taken to believing their own extremes of rhetoric.21 
The indiscriminate violence of the RAF was directed not against a society 
which had failed but against one which had produced the German 
economic miracle out of the ashes of World War II. As for creating a 
mass movement with roots in political legitimacy, the Baader-Meinhof 
gang had clearly sown their seed on infertile soil. 
The spoiled children of the Baader-Meinhof gang had access to the 
best their country had to offer. To these sons and daughters of the 
bourgeoisie, "the working class" was an abstraction. The real working 
class was something distant and foreign, something with which they had 
no real contact.22 Rather than being enamored with these defenders of 
the proletariat, Communist and socialist politicians in Germany openly 
denounced terrorism. Not surprisingly, the working classes joined their 
political representatives in blessing the creation of new police powers to 
fight terrorism. These powers strengthened search and arrest procedures 
and gun control laws. They created counterterrorist units and opened the 
way for police monitoring of both telephone conversations and cor-
respondence of friends and relatives of suspected terrorists.23 
The mood throughout Western societies under the threat of ter-
rorism was summed up at the time by Lord Shackleton, the author of 
Britain's anti-terrorism act, "Basic civil liberties include the rights to stay 
alive and go about one's business without fear." Only a hard-core of 
alienated youth in the West seemed to think otherwise and gave their 
sympathy to terrorism.25 
FROM ANARCHISM TO FIGHTING COMMUNISTS 
By attacking NATO, this new generation of RAF has found a sym-
bolic issue that has the potential to attract a number of sympathizers 
among the current generation of alienated youth in Europe.26 In one tac-
tical leap terrorism in Western Europe has gone from the periphery of 
the youth movement to merge ideologically with a radical politics which 
perceives NATO and the basing of nuclear weapons on the soil of 
Western Europe as the most pressing issues of the day. The twisted 
justifications of violence so cavalierly espoused by Baader and Ensslin 
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have been replaced by the rhetorical "idealism" of Ulrike Meinhof, in 
her earlier incarnation as a journalist.27 Before she made the transition 
from advocacy to violence, Meinhof was the darling of the radical left. 
Her characterization of German society as seeking the destruction of all 
humanity through nuclear annihilation in the same fashion that it had 
sought the destruction of the Jews through the death camps struck a 
responsive chord among the radical elements of youth, a generation 
which felt the shame and disgust of the deeds of their parents and carried 
the sins of the fathers as if they were their own. 
For Meinhof, Germany was not the showcase of democratic institu-
tions seeking to hide the shame of its Nazi past. Instead, Germany was 
still the "Auschwitz generation" garbed in the trappings of democracy 
while spreading the gangrene of "western imperialism" which could only 
be stopped by moral outrage.2' Eventually she reached the ideological 
position, so well identified with the nineteenth century philosopher Pro-
udhon, that the state itself was corruption. Hence there could be no such 
thing as a crime against the state.29 
As German youth imitated its American counterpart during the 
1960s, so too the German youth movement in its own way followed the 
same extremes of rhetorical and political nonsense.30 Whereas in 
America members of the youth movement of the 1960s evolved into the 
professionals of the 1980s and moved politically toward the right, in Ger-
many radicalism not only persisted, it grew. 
By 1977, American radicalism had subsided as the Vietnam era 
receded into political memory. In contrast, in Germany 1977 became a 
watershed year for radicalism. Not only did 1977 mark the beginning of 
the anti-neutron bomb protest campaign, which later developed into a 
larger campaign against the modernization of NATO nuclear forces, the 
year also saw German youth merging environmental issues with political 
radicalism. In May, France opened the Fessenheim nuclear reactor just 
across the German border. Sabotaged in 1975, Fessenheim became a 
symbol for environmentalists and the reactor's opening was an occasion 
which precipitated a convergence of demonstrators of various stripes 
from both sides of the border who tried to crash police lines in an effort 
to keep the reactor from going on line. The same year saw the "Green 
List for Environmental Protection" (Grüne Liste Umveltshutz/GLU), 
the first environmental electoral list, established in Lower Saxony. The 
list was established by leaders of the demonstrations against the nuclear 
reactors at Gorleben and Kalkar and was successful in local elections. 
Buoyed by this success, the GLU moved on to compete on two fronts, 
parliamentary politics and mass acts of civil disobedience. Although 
unable to capture the necessary 5 percent of the vote for parliamentary 
representation during its 1978 Lantag campaigns, the Greens drew strong 
media attention and became attractive to another source — the organized 
political left. The Communist League (Kommunistisches Bund/KB) and 
the Communist League of West Germany (Kommunistisches Bund 
Westdeutschlands/KBW) both gravitated to the Greens, less because of 
concerns for the environment than for finding a mass movement already 
in place which these organized communist groups could manipulate.31 
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The roots of the Greens did not lie on the ultra-left. The Greens 
drew their support from large numbers of conservative environmentalists 
as well as moderate leftists. However, their success as a party attracted 
remnants of the Extra-Parliamentary Opposition (Ausserparlamentarish 
Opposition/APO) and its sub-group, the better known German Socialist 
Student League (Sozialistischer Deutscher Studentenbund/SDS). These 
groups were concerned with overthrowing the capitalist system in West 
Germany and their intrusion into the Greens drove out segments of the 
conservative environmentalists and moderate leftists. This paved the way 
for the fusion of environmental issues with the politics of the ultra-left." 
A persistent theme of this fusion is that the current "ecological phase" 
of capitalism will try to save itself by increasing economic exploitation, 
political oppression and destruction of the environment.33 
That this intrusion has occurred does not mean that ultra-leftists 
dominate in the Greens. The composition of the inner leadership varies 
significantly from region to region. Nonetheless, communist themes — 
the anti-NATO posture among them — have served to create the founda-
tions for an existent Red-Green alliance and these expressions have 
found a resonance among Germany's alienated youth who view the 
Greens as part of the alternative movement against capitalism. 
Recent criticisms of the Greens for entering into correspondence 
with the incarcerated members of the RAF34 and the defeat of the Greens 
at the polls, in the 1985 Land elections in both North-Rhine Westphalia 
and the Saar,35 may appear to suggest that the threat from this segment is 
less serious than ever before. Nonetheless, it is largely immaterial — 
from the perspective of this analysis — whether the Greens received 5 
percent at the polls or 3.8 percent. What is important is that the new ter-
rorism has achieved what its predecessors had not — an articulation with 
a mass movement, however tangential that relationship is, and however 
unrepresentative that relationship may be of the diverse composition of 
the Greens. The Greens have come to represent a hospitable environment 
for the new terrorism to take root. 
It should be remembered that the Greens exhibit the continuing 
themes of the radical elements of the 1960s, combining environmental 
concerns with anti-nuclear issues. Among the Greens and their 
ideological compatriots is found the same sense of moral outrage and 
alienation which gave rise to Meinhof s brand of "idealistic" radical 
journalism. Here, in this shared alienation and persistent moral outrage, 
exists a sympathetic environment for the new brand of terrorism.36 
The new terrorism draws heavily on these earlier themes of alienated 
youth. It has shown signs of rejecting the nihilistic image popularly 
associated with Baader as adventurer. Instead, it has turned to the earlier 
writings of Meinhof for ideological sustenance and to Baader's view of 
himself as a Marxist striving for radical social change in an exploitative 
repressive system more accurately characterized, as he viewed it, by its 
Nazi past than its democratic present. For Baader, fond as he was of Sar-
tre, the only way to exorcise this systematic corruption was to liberate it 
through violence." 
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The heirs to the Baader-Meinhof gang, the new Red Army Faction, 
call themselves "fighting communists," a title which has not yet, at least, 
gained much currency for them in the media, but one which is widely us-
ed in radical European circles. This nomenclature serves to distinguish 
them from the anarchist characterization so much in evidence in de-
scribing their predecessors. It also sets them apart from what they have 
come to regard as the "bourgeoisie communists" of the older generation 
who have sold out the revolutionary spirit of Marxism for the material 
rewards of trade unionism." 
TACTICAL COOPERATION 
Not only is this new tactic sustained by a different ideological em-
phasis evident in the recent wave of bombings and assassinations but 
many observers of terrorism are talking about a new cooperation bet-
ween terrorist groups. The assassination of French Brigadier General 
Rene Audran in Paris on January 25, 1985 appears to have been a 
cooperative venture between the French-based Direct Action and the Red 
Army Faction." 
Terrorist groups have been providing each other with mutual aid 
since the early 1970s. The Japanese Red Army carried out the massacre 
at Israel's Lod Airport in May 1972 on behalf of the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine. Basque separatists murdered a high-ranking 
member of the Franco regime with a bomb supplied by the Irish 
Republican Army. Members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Turkey and scores of other terrorist groups have received training from 
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, who in turn have 
received training in the Soviet Union in what some have called "the 
trickle down theory of international terrorism." In fact, it was through 
the PFLP that the Baader-Meinhof gang developed independent ties to 
the Japanese Red Army.40 
Whatever doubts may have existed about cooperation between ter-
rorist groups were laid to rest by the Israeli capture of dozens of erstwhile 
terrorists from all over the globe training in southern Lebanon. Captured 
PLO documents indicated that, between 1980 and 1981, some 2300 ter-
rorists from twenty-eight different countries were trained at bases in 
Lebanon. Included in this mélange were representatives of the new 
"fighting communists," of Italy's Red Brigades, of West Germany's 
Red Army Faction and of France's Direct Action.41 
The reason that the media have seized on the "new cooperation" is 
not so much because it is new, but because it can no longer be ignored. In 
the new terrorism, the groups themselves have gone to great lengths to 
publicize their cooperation.42 Indeed, from a tactical perspective, this 
type of cooperation is a clear departure from previous terrorist thinking. 
Prior to the new wave of terrorism, Europe's "fighting communists" 
adhered to the well known Pamphlet Number 4 of the Italian Red 
Brigades, the guiding principle of which was the prohibition of common 
tactical operations. Clearly, the new terrorism has departed from that 
position in quest of greater effectiveness and in an effort to build a larger 
mass following.43 
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THE NEW THREAT: POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
The new terrorism is a more formidable threat than was the ter-
rorism of indiscriminate violence. The Baader-Meinhof gang drew sym-
pathy from only the most alienated segments of radical youth. Directed 
violence is a more sophisticated tactic and has greater propaganda value. 
Sown in an environment of a European generation which perceives 
NATO and capitalism — and not the Soviets — as the major evils in 
Europe, the new terrorism will find a larger group of sympathizers and 
even perhaps a larger groups of potential recruits.44 
In May 1985 West German police did indeed discover that the RAF 
had found a new source of recruits for their action groups, namely 
among sympathizers no longer content to wait for social change to come 
about through marches and demonstrations. Called "illegal militants," 
this group, unlike other action groups which operate underground and 
are full-time terrorists, lives a normal life-style which does not attract at-
tention. On weekends they can be pressed into service as bombers and 
assassins, returning to respectability after their mission is accomplished. 
There is even speculation that individuals drawn from this group assisted 
Direct Action in its assassination of Brigadier Audran.45 
The new threat should also be seen in terms of the legitimacy which 
is contained in the new terrorism. By aligning with a cause which is 
perceived as just, the new terrorism is far more appealing to the segment 
of alienated youth seeking an alternative to capitalism. (The Greens, it is 
useful to remember, are only one contingent of what in Germany is fre-
quently called "the alternative.") Such legitimacy helps to recruit 
alienated youth into terrorism and to create the networks which terrorists 
desperately need to survive in an urban environment. Certainly, in terms 
of an ultimate, immediate threat to NATO specifically, or Western 
Europe generally, it is highly doubtful that terrorism, new or old, will 
topple either. Yet, what might happen is that the irritant which terrorism 
presents coupled with the pressure from mass demonstrations might 
make NATO countries even less receptive to modernization of their 
forces and expansion of their commitments, especially when it comes to 
stationing nuclear weapons on their soil. Those kinds of decisions can 
have negative reverberations from an American whose economy is beset 
by a disadvantageous trade balance and whose national debt appears to 
be without feasible political or economic remedy. The new terrorism may 
be no more than an irritant, but perhaps it is one which will add to 
weaknesses, divisions, and confusions already present in the alliance, at a 
time when Moscow continues to enhance her own capabilities. 
If there is any consolation when observing this new wave of ter-
rorism, it is that the new terrorism has the potential to force greater 
cooperation among Western nations which until until now have gone 
though the ritual of signing international conventions which are neither 
enforced nor taken seriously. Recognition of this new reality can mean 
cooperation in terms of the legal maxim "extradite or prosecute." To 
date, the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, signed 
by seventeen members of the Council of Europe, is not being effectively 
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enforced.46 Italy, for example, is still unable to get France to accede to 
repeated requests for the extradition of 120 members of the Italian Red 
Brigades. 
France's lack of cooperation grows out of its long tradition of ex-
empting political crimes from extradition — "the political exception." 
Although the purpose of the European Convention was to do away with 
the political exception, legal expert Robert A. Friedlander notes that the 
agreement is so loosely worded as to permit France to disregard it.47 
Moreover, the Convention has been entangled in European politics. 
France sees her enforcement of the Convention — she has signed but not 
ratified it — as contingent on former French President Giscard 
d'Estang's proposal for a European Judicial Zone. The Netherlands has 
objected and in response France has not acceded to implementing the 
Convention. There are, of course, other concerns for the French. There 
is speculation that France, unwilling to incur the wrath of Basque ter-
rorists operating against Spain, has found it in its own interest not to en-
force anti-terrorist agreements of any kind but instead to develop a tacit 
understanding with international terrorists that France will not bother 
them if they do not commit crimes on French soil. As the relationship 
between Direct Action and the RAF develops, France will be forced to 
reconsider this stance.4' 
Terrorism is becoming tactically, politically and technologically 
more sophisticated. It can no longer be dealt with as simply the problem 
of an individual Western nation experiencing an individual attack. The 
new terrorism teaches us that these attacks are now directed at the very 
bastion of the defense of the West. If the new terrorism moves Western 
European governments to greater cooperation in their anti-terrorist ac-
tivities, it will have to be along both legal and tactical lines. Edward 
Bridgeman, a consultant on international terrorism to the International 
Association of Chiefs of Police, sees the new terrorism as encouraging 
more cross-training between NATO's anti-terrorist forces. The role of 
the two British Army explosives experts who accompanied the West Ger-
man GSG-9 in their raid against the RAF group at Mogadishu is taken as 
a model for the kind of cooperation which must be continued and ex-
tended. There is also a greater need for cooperation in the gathering and 
dissemination of intelligence data as it relates to terrorist groups.30 
Before that can happen, the United States will have to undertake a 
restructuring of its commitment to its own intelligence community. The 
destruction of entire covert operations networks in Europe and elsewhere 
under the Carter administration, and the image, accurate or not, that the 
Europeans have of the workings of the Freedom of Information Act has 
created a formidable obstacle to the cooperation between European and 
American intelligence communities." 
The new terrorism in Western Europe, as well as Shiite actions 
against American interests in the Middle East, may yet result in the 
United States recreating a strong role for human intelligence gathering. 
This would help pave the way for both stronger cooperation and better 
intelligence sharing within NATO on political terrorism. 
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If the new terrorism does move Western European governments and 
the United States toward greater cooperation in their anti-terrorist ac-
tivities, we may yet see the silver lining in the dark cloud currently hang-
ing over Western Europe. 
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